1. Introduction
The United Nations Security Council, as the principal organ responsible for maintaining international peace and security, has remained continuously engaged with Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. The adoption of Resolution 1373 (2001), followed by subsequent resolutions addressing international terrorism, sanctions, and the security situation in Afghanistan, established an extensive institutional framework for counterterrorism. Nevertheless, the continued presence of terrorist groups, the persistence of political and military instability, and the deterioration of the security situation by 2021 reveal a significant gap between the Council’s institutional engagement and its concrete outcomes. This study asks: How did geopolitical rivalries among the major powers affect the effectiveness of the UN Security Council in combating terrorism in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021? It hypothesizes that great-power geopolitical rivalries reduced the Council’s effectiveness through their effects on three interconnected levels: decision-making, operational implementation, and institutional structure. The study addresses a gap in the existing literature by examining the mechanisms through which geopolitical competition was translated into institutional and operational ineffectiveness, based on the Council’s official resolutions and meeting records.
2. Theoretical Framework
The study employs Henry Kissinger’s concept of “managerial realism” as its analytical framework. From this perspective, international institutions are not autonomous and neutral actors but arenas in which major powers negotiate, compete, and manage their national interests. Their effectiveness therefore depends substantially on the ability of major powers to manage their strategic rivalry and maintain a workable balance of power. When such rivalry cannot be effectively managed through diplomacy, international institutions may become arenas of conflict rather than mechanisms for collective problem-solving. Accordingly, Security Council effectiveness is assessed through three dimensions: the capacity to adopt clear and enforceable decisions, the effective implementation of those decisions, and the preservation of institutional impartiality, legitimacy, and coordination capacity.
3. Methodology
This qualitative and functional study employs directed qualitative content analysis. The units of analysis consist of Security Council resolutions, official meeting records, and reports of the Secretary-General and sanctions-monitoring mechanisms concerning Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021. Five strategically significant resolutions—1373, 1386, 1822, 1988, and 2593—and three key meeting records were purposively selected because they represent major turning points in the Council’s approach to Afghanistan. The analysis applies theoretically derived categories including selective legitimation, structured ambiguity, institutionalized rivalry, and structural deadlock.
4. Results & Discussion
The findings confirm the hypothesis and reveal a progressive decline in Security Council effectiveness across three periods. During 2001–2008, US predominance shaped the Council’s response through selective legitimation and structured ambiguity. Resolution 1373 provided broad legal authorization for counterterrorism measures, while Resolution 1386 reflected a compromise between the US security-oriented approach and the sovereignty-centered concerns of Russia and China. Although this compromise facilitated consensus, ambiguity concerning the scope and geographical limits of the ISAF mandate contributed to divergent interpretations and operational difficulties. Resolution 1822 marked a transition toward institutionalized competition within monitoring mechanisms.
During 2009–2015, geopolitical rivalry became increasingly embedded in the Council’s institutional and monitoring mechanisms. Resolution 1988 and the creation of a separate Taliban sanctions regime illustrate how competition moved from the broader Council chamber into specialized sanctions committees. Divergent interpretations of sanctions criteria, competing priorities, and disagreements over implementation weakened both operational effectiveness and institutional impartiality. The Council increasingly relied on ambiguous formulations that preserved formal consensus but limited its capacity to formulate and implement a coherent strategy.
The final period, 2016–2021, represents the culmination of this process in structural deadlock. The debate surrounding Resolution 2593 demonstrated profound divergence among the major powers regarding engagement with the Taliban, human rights, sovereignty, and the future political order of Afghanistan. The Council remained unable to translate its decisions into effective mechanisms of implementation. The failure to prevent the continued financing and arming of the Taliban, the persistence of terrorist networks, and the worsening security situation exposed the widening gap between Council decisions and realities on the ground. Overall, the three periods demonstrate a clear trajectory from gradual decline, through intensified institutional rivalry, to structural deadlock. The study identifies a chain of mechanisms—selective legitimation, structured ambiguity, institutionalized rivalry, and structural deadlock—through which geopolitical competition progressively undermined decision-making, implementation, and institutional legitimacy.
5. Conclusions & Suggestions
The study concludes that the effectiveness of the Security Council in Afghanistan was not an independent institutional variable but was strongly conditioned by the capacity of major powers to manage their geopolitical rivalry. The Afghan case supports Kissinger’s proposition that unmanaged great-power competition can transform international institutions from mechanisms of collective security into arenas of strategic contestation. The findings also suggest that institutional reform alone is unlikely to resolve such problems unless accompanied by mechanisms capable of managing major-power rivalry. Strengthening smaller-group multilateral cooperation among states with shared interests and political will may provide a complementary mechanism for reducing the adverse effects of great-power competition on collective security.