1. Introduction
The West Asia and North Africa region has experienced highly significant developments following October 7, particularly the 12-day and 40-day wars. It appears that the trajectory of developments after these events will continue, and further developments, such as the expansion of the Abraham Accords, should also be expected. The fundamental question that this article seeks to answer is: What impact have the aggregate of developments that have occurred, and those currently unfolding in the post–October 7 period, had on geopolitics, power equations, and order in the West Asia region?
2. Theoretical Framework
This study employs the Regional Security Complex Theory as its main explanatory paradigm for examining the structural transformations in the West Asian regional system. According to Barry Buzan’s approach, regional systems are defined not as static subsystems, but as dynamic complexes of amity and enmity relationships, whose boundaries are drawn on the basis of the intensity of security interactions.
Alongside the aforementioned systemic approach, this article utilizes the “conceptual innovation” of the blocking actor to explain Israel’s asymmetric agency. This concept, formulated in conjunction with the propositions of “offensive realism” and the strategy of “denial” (preventing an enemy’s access or agency within a specific geographical space), emphasizes the transition from agency based on traditional balancing toward a radical monopoly in defining the rules of the regional order. Accordingly, Israel’s military movements in the peripheral maritime expanses (the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa) and its efforts to deprive rivals of their capacity for agency are interpreted not as tactical reactions, but rather as a form of “structural deterrence.” The ultimate goal of this deterrence is to block the field of independent action for other regional actors and to redefine the hierarchy of power within the new security architecture of West Asia
3. Methodology
This study is a strategic analysis employing a descriptive–analytical approach and utilizing a process-tracing model to examine the structural transformations in the West Asian regional system and its linkage with the security subsystems of the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and East Africa following October 7.
4. Results & Discussion
In response to the research question, the hypothesis examined is, first, that recent developments—by undermining the West Asia and North Africa regional system as an independent regional system—have turned it into a regional system dependent on the United States as an extra-regional power, which in itself entails serious consequences for the member states of the West Asia and North Africa regional system. Second, Israel’s maritime-strategic expansion into the Red Sea and Horn of Africa subsystems has taken place in order to control the security of the West Asia and North Africa region from Israel’s side, and this expansion will intensify further in the future. Third, the consequence of this expansion is the transformation of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea periphery into a contested region among regional powers (regional actors), namely Turkey, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
This article demonstrated that the developments following October 7—and especially Israel’s 12-day war against Iran—have led to a significant reconfiguration of security dynamics in West Asia and North Africa. The research findings indicate that these developments have, first, diminished the level of autonomy of the West Asia and North Africa regional security complex, and, by increasing direct U.S. intervention and support for Israel, have intensified the penetration of extra-regional power into this security complex. From this perspective, the regional security order has become, more than ever, exposed to the outward projection of Washington’s and its allies’ security preferences and considerations, and a part of its indigenous self-regulatory capacity has been weakened.
Second, the article demonstrated that, following these developments, the pattern of Israel’s presence in the peripheral environment of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa has been redefined. Although Israel had previously maintained a security and intelligence presence on some coasts, ports, and islands of this area, this presence has acquired a different function after the 12-day war—evolving from a complementary presence into a more significant component of its compensatory strategy for creating maritime strategic depth, enhancing situational awareness, and reducing vulnerability to pressure from Iran and actors aligned with it. In this sense, for Israel the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa are not merely a geographical periphery, but are gradually becoming one of the arenas intertwined with threat management within the West Asia and North Africa security complex.
Third, the findings corroborate that the intensification of this trend turns the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea littoral, more than ever, into an arena of competition among regional and extra-regional actors. The expansion of Israel’s presence in this expanse, alongside the presence and interests of other actors such as Iran, Turkey, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the interventions of great powers, can lead to the intensification of geopolitical competition, an increased risk of conflict spillover, and a strengthening of the security interconnectedness among West Asia, the Red Sea, and the Horn of Africa. Accordingly, this area is no longer merely a peripheral appendage, but is becoming one of the focal points influencing the region’s broader security equations.
Based on these findings, the article’s initial hypotheses are also confirmed: first, the diminished autonomy of the regional security complex and its increased dependence on U.S. intervention; second, Israel’s maritime-strategic expansion into the sub-complexes of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa; and third, the transformation of this area into an arena of competition and contestation among multiple actors. In this way, the article argues that the developments following October 7 and the 12-day war have led not only to a change in the balance of power, but also to a redefinition of the security interlinkages between the peripheral sub-complexes and the core of West Asia and North Africa
5. Conclusions & Suggestions
The article shows that, under conditions of intensified extra-regional intervention and the heightened salience of threats emanating from peripheral sub-regions, an expanded reading of Regional Security Complex Theory can better explain the process of declining regional autonomy, the reconfiguration of peripheral security linkages, and the increasing prominence of actors with structural blocking capacity. From this perspective, the present study argues that recent developments do not merely represent a shift in the intensity of competition, but rather indicate a form of spatial-strategic recomposition in regional security, through which the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa are becoming more deeply embedded in the security calculations of West Asia and North Africa. At the research level, this finding also opens the way for future studies on the mechanisms of extra-regional influence, the function of blocking actors, and the security linkages among West Asia, the Red Sea, and the Horn of Africa.