1. Introduction
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a political system whose identity and legitimacy are substantially grounded in the doctrines of political Shiism. This religious dimension has played an important role in shaping both the domestic political order and Iran’s foreign and regional policies. Following the emergence of the concept of “national reconciliation” as a central theme of the Fourteenth Administration under President Masoud Pezeshkian, examining the relationship between the religious dimensions of national reconciliation and the regional policy of the Islamic Republic has acquired particular significance. This study seeks to answer the following question: How do the religious components of national reconciliation and the regional policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran affect one another? The central hypothesis is that any interpretation of the religious dimensions of national reconciliation, through changes in the configuration of social, religious, and symbolic capital, affects Iran’s capacity for regional and international agency. Conversely, the outcomes and costs of regional and international policies influence domestic legitimacy, social trust, and the reproduction or erosion of national reconciliation. The study employs a descriptive-analytical approach and draws primarily on Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory, particularly the concepts of field, capital, and habitus, to establish an integrated framework for analyzing the interaction between religion, national reconciliation, and regional policy. Rather than treating domestic politics, regional politics, and international relations as separate spheres, the study conceptualizes the agency of the Islamic Republic as operating through three interconnected fields: the domestic, regional, and international fields. Each field possesses its own actors, rules, forms of capital, and relations of power, while changes in one field can lead to the redistribution and transformation of capital in the others
2. Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework demonstrates that social, religious, and symbolic capital constitute critical resources in the domestic field. Religious communities, collective rituals, networks of trust, shared Shiite identity, and religious institutions can generate social capital and contribute to political legitimacy and social cohesion. Religious narratives and symbols—including the concepts of Karbala, martyrdom, justice, resistance, and the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih—can also function as symbolic capital when they are socially recognized as legitimate sources of authority and collective meaning. From a Bourdieusian perspective, these forms of capital are not static resources; they can be converted into one another and mobilized by political actors in struggles over legitimacy, identity, and the definition of national interests.
The study further argues that national reconciliation in the Iranian context cannot be reduced to political agreement or institutional cooperation. It involves competing interpretations of the relationship between religion, citizenship, political participation, law, and foreign policy. Within the revolutionary-Islamic habitus, national reconciliation is primarily associated with religious identity, Islamic solidarity, independence, resistance to domination, and opposition to imperialism. In contrast, the reformist habitus places greater emphasis on pluralism, equal citizenship, civil rights, rule of law, dialogue, and constructive engagement with the international system. These two habitus should not be understood merely as competing policy preferences; rather, they represent competing attempts to define legitimate political conduct, national interests, and the boundaries of consensus within the domestic field.
The regional field of West Asia constitutes a second interconnected arena. It is characterized by competition among different interpretations of Islam, particularly Shiite, Salafi-Takfiri, and Muslim Brotherhood-oriented discourses, as well as competition among states, religious institutions, transnational networks, and non-state actors. Within this field, Iran seeks to convert religious and symbolic capital into political influence and strategic capacity through support for resistance movements, the Palestinian cause, and regional networks. The “Axis of Resistance” is therefore interpreted not solely as a military or security arrangement, but also as a network through which ideological, symbolic, social, and political resources can be accumulated and converted. At the same time, the study emphasizes the limits of this strategy. Regional opposition to Iranian policies, sectarian sensitivities, concerns about Iranian intervention, and the costs associated with regional competition can constrain the conversion of religious capital into sustainable political influence.
The international field constitutes the third arena, in which Iran interacts and competes with the United States, European powers, Russia, China, Israel, and the existing international order. International sanctions, geopolitical pressures, diplomatic negotiations, and external efforts to constrain Iran can affect the domestic distribution of social and symbolic capital. The JCPOA and its fate illustrates this reciprocal relationship: while part of Iranian society interpreted nuclear diplomacy as evidence of constructive international engagement and an opportunity for economic improvement, another part viewed it through the lenses of strategic independence and resistance to great-power influence.
3. Methodology
The study employs a descriptive-analytical approach and draws primarily on Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory, particularly the concepts of field, capital, and habitus, to establish an integrated framework for analyzing the interaction between religion, national reconciliation, and regional policy.
4. Results & Discussion
The findings indicate that the relationship between religion, national reconciliation, and Iran’s regional policy is neither linear nor one-directional. Religious capital may be converted into social and symbolic capital, thereby strengthening domestic cohesion and enhancing Iran’s regional soft power and capacity for collective action. However, when political polarization, declining public trust, economic pressures, or the perceived costs of regional policies weaken social capital, the symbolic legitimacy of the political system may also be affected, reducing the domestic support available for foreign policy. Regional policy can therefore simultaneously serve as a source of symbolic legitimacy and become a source of domestic contestation over the meaning and priorities of national interests.
5. Conclusions & Suggestions
The study concludes that the sustainability of Iran’s regional agency depends not only on material capabilities and geopolitical calculations but also on the continuous reproduction of social legitimacy, religious capital, symbolic capital, and domestic consensus. From a Bourdieusian perspective, effective regional agency requires maintaining a balance among religious legitimacy, social cohesion, governmental effectiveness, and strategic capacity. The study also concludes that the six conceptualizations of national reconciliation building, dissolution of conflicting identities, peaceful coexistence, individual moral transformation, rule of law and human rights, and community-building—generate different relationships between religion and foreign policy. Among these, the community-building conception is particularly compatible with field theory because it emphasizes networks of trust, participation, interdependence, and the continuous reproduction of social and symbolic capital. Accordingly, national reconciliation should not be understood as the elimination of political and religious differences, but as the institutional and social capacity to manage differences while preserving sufficient common ground for collective action.